In his influential 1980 book, Competitive Strategy, Michael Porter asserted the need for "sophisticated competitor analysis" in the modern corporation, and hence "the need for an organized mechanism --some sort of competitor intelligence system --to insure that the process is efficient." (p. 72) The growing complexity of the competitive environment of many industries during the 1980s convinced many top managers that they did indeed need more systematic analysis of their competitors, and during the 1980s many large corporations set up specialized competitor analysis systems. A 1985 survey of some of the Fortune 500 companies revealed that over a third of the companies sampled were spending over $1 million a year on competitor analysis and had at least one individuel devoted full time to the activity (Information Data Search, 1985) . In the United States, a new professional Many managers agreed in principle with the desirability of what one practicioner described as "an organized competitor intelligence system [that] acts like an interlinked radar grid that constantly monitors competitor activity, filters the raw information picked up by externe] and internai sources, processes it for strategic significance, and efficiently communicates actionable intelligence to those who need it" (Sammon, 1984: 71 ).
Yet however clearly the growing number of competitor analysis (CA) specialists articulated the model of the ideal system and however sophisticated the methodologies developed for gathering and analyzing competitor information, building the organizational systems for competitor analysis proved more difficult than its advocates had anticipated (Prescott and Smith, 1987: 411; Daft et al, 1988: 136) . Nevertheless, the growing literature on competitor analysis has continued to focus on methodologies, rather than on illuminating the development of the organizational systems of competitor analysis. Research into the structures and processes of competitor analysis in the corporate context has been virtually nonexistent. Yet precisely such research is necessary if we are to understand 2 where the main problems in developing a competitor analysis system lie: to what extent they are the consequence of inadequate methodologies (Amit et al, 1988: 432) ; inappropriate modes of dissemination (Daft et al, 1988: 136) ; inappropriate allocation of effort (Prescott and Smith, 1987) ; inadequate support from top management, as has been the case with other kinds of environmental scanning units (Lenz and Engledow, 1986a) ; or other kinds of structure and process problems. This paper describes the competitor analysis systems in three large multinational corporations, how its problems and prospects are seen by those most closely involved in it and those served by it, and examines the organizational mechanisms developed to address those problems.
The Study
The study was conducted in three of the world's largest multinational companies, each in a different industry: General Motors, Eastman Kodak, and British Petroleum. These tiras are neither typical, in the sense of being close to the mean of size and dispersion in their repective industries, nor longstanding exemplars of best practice in competitor analysis. However, both the high-level management commitment to developing systems to make these firms more responsive to their increasingly competitive business environments and their ability to generate the resources to develop the specialized formai competitor analysis systems recommended in the strategic literature cited above make them promising grounds for studying the development and operation of such systems.
Between January and July of 1986, we spent between four and six weeks full-time in each of these companies and conducted between 40 and 70 semistructured interviews. 1 There were three categories of interview respondents: those who had formai responsibility for competitor analysis, either full or part time (referred to in this paper as "analysts"); staff managers to whom analysts reported, who were themselves not users of the information ("managers of analysts" ); and a subset of those whom each analysts or analysis unit identified as primary internai clients and users of competitor information ("clients"). In the three companies, we interviewed in total 73 analysts, 17 managers of analysts, and 63 clients.
The interviews with the analysts focused on sources of information (external and internai); how the information was processed, analysed, and 3 disseminated; interactions with usera and perceptions of how the information was used; personal learning curves; problems encountered in the function; and anticipated future directions of development in the function. The interviews with the managers of analysts also covered perceptions of use, personal learning curves, assessments of problems, and anticipated future developments; in addition, they were asked about the evolution of the function and the criteria by which its performance was assessed. The interviews with clients focused on the array of sources to which they looked for competitor information and on the salience of the formai CA function in that array; perceived changes in the function over the preceding two years and anticipated future changes, in terms of information provided and information needs; and on how they personally used competitor information.
An examination of the documents produced by the CA units supplemented the interviews and allowed us to ask clients how they evaluated specific outputs.
THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE CA FUNCTION
Competitor Analysis in ail three corporations involved a dispersed and interconnected system rather than a single CA unit. Ail three companies had a global business structure, with business group management level between the corporate and the SBU levels. Each of the companies had formel, multimember competitor analysis units at the corporate level, and additional units or specialized individuel analysts at the group and most of the strategic business unit levels. CA was also formalized in different geographic units, although there was greater variation among country subsidiaries in the extent of formalization of CA than there was among the business units. In addition, there were other CA units linked to specific functions. In ail three firms, the corporate R&D organization had formalized competitor analysis in the areas of technology and product development, and in one company there were also formai CA positions in manufacturing. In ail three companies, while some top managers were seen as more enthusiastic supporters of the competitor analysis function than others, there was apparently broad-based management support for the development of the function.2
At the corporate level, the CA unit had two mandates: to follow companies that were "corporate competitors" competing with the firm across 4 multiple lines of business, and to function as a "center of expertise," keeping abreast of the most effective and efficient tools of competitor analysis and disseminating them to analysts elsewhere in the organization.
In the first role, the major clients were top corporate management, general managers in the groups and SBUs, and corporate planning staff. In the second role, the constitutents served were other competitor analysts throughout the company. Given that the former set of clients had much more prestige and power than the latter (and much more control over the allocation of resources to support the CA activity), there was a strong tendency to concentrate on the first mandate at the expense of the second.3
At the group level there was considerable variation even within each company. Some groups developed an active formai CA unit, while others decided to locate competitor analysis entirely within the SBUs. The choice seemed to be influenced primarily by the amount of planning and strategic decision-making carried out by group management and by the structure of competition. Where the SBUs had a high level of autonomy, the CA function at the group level was weak or even non-existent. And where there were few competitors that the SBUs had in common, there was little reason to maintain a group-level unit to integrate and share the information gathered by the SBU analysts. Where group-level CA activity had developed, its primary clients included SBU managers and planners as well as group-level general management and planners.
At the SBU level, CA focused on the companies (or divisions of companies) that competed in that particular business. Usually one individual carried the formai responsibility for CA, either on a full-time or part-time basis, although in each company there were a few SBUs where formai CA had not yet been created. The major clients were the SBU's general manager and its business planner(s), although in a few cases the analysts defined their clients more broadly to include line managers throughout the SBU and even (in two cases) sales people in the field.
The "clients" interviewed in the course of this study were therefore similar across the three companies: top corporate management, general managers of groups and SBUs, and the top-ranking strategic planner at each level.
PERCEIVED PROBLEMS IN DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE COMPETITOR ANALYSIS 5
In ail three companies an overwhelming majority of clients asserted that understanding competitors was extremely important and growing in importance. Expressions such as "absolutely vital" and "you can't imagine not using it" were common. However, a majority of both the clients and the analysts perceived a significant gap between what was needed by the organization and what was currently being delivered by the company's competitor analysis system. With very few exceptions, however, there was general agreement that a formai system was necessary and that what was called for was improvement in the current system, rather than its abandonnent.
Clients and analysts put forward an array of factors to explain the gap between expectations and performance.4 These are summarized in Table 1, which divides the factors into two categories: those internai to the competitor analysis system, and those external to it.
The similarities across the three companies in the factors cited in open-ended questions were striking. Among the client responses, twelve of the eighteen factors were cited in ail three companies, three in two, and only three factors in a single company. There was less similarity among the analysts: eight of the nineteen factors were cited by respondents in ail three companies, seven in two, and four in only one.
--- Table 1 about here ---Clients and scanners agreed that there were problems to be resolved both within the scanning function and in the larger context in which it operated.
But while analysts were more likely to emphasize the contextual problems they faced, for clients the balance was tilted towards problems within the function itself.
Factors External to the CA Function
The factors external to the CA function can be subdivided into factors within the rest of the corporation itself, and factors in the environment outside the firm. The latter, including potential legai constraints on obtaining useful competitor information and the existence of good alternative external sources (such as the business press or personal networks) were mentioned by only a small number of respondents. However, the factor cited by the largest number of analysts and the second largest number of clients concerned the organizational context of the function: 6 managerial culture, specifically the réluctance of managers to try to use staff-generated analysis in general or competitor analysis in particular.
Included in this category were commenta about traditions of ignoring competitors, because of a historical legacy of market leadership (in the words of one manager, "We believed that other firms had to pay attention to us"), and fears of anti-trust actions by the government. However, some comments were more general: for example, a tradition of "management by instinct." As one manager described it, "Some of these guys will look at the data, but it makes them uncomfortable; they like to fly by the seat of their pants." And several clients and analysts said that while there was a growing willingness to pay attention to "hard data," many managers (particularly those with an engineering or finance background) had trouble with "soft" data, by which they meant any information without numbers attached. As one client described it, "Managers need numbers they can move the organization with."
Clients and analysts shared a recognition of more specific information management problems within the organization that complicated the job of competitor analysis, although again, more analysts than clients perceived this as an important issue.
More analysts than clients were concerned with information blockages in general in the organization; as one manager put it, "Information just doesn't move in this company." Information overload, a factor we expected to hear cited frequently, was mentioned by only one client and one analyst. But for the analysts, the most frequently cited general information management problem was the use of information, The factors internai to the CA function itself, when put into the context of how the analysts and their managers described their activities, can be divided into three activity clusters. One centers on information handling, or "data management:" that is, activities such as acquiring, classifying, storing, retrieving, editing, verifying, aggregating, and distributing information --activities that involve handling the information but not attempting to derive a higher-order meaning from it. The second cluster is "analysis," which involves interpreting the data to understand or predict competitor behaviour. The third cluster or dimension, "implication," addresses the question of how the company could or should respond. Each set of activities involves distinctive but interrelated skills.
The problem cited by the highest proportion of clients belongs in the implication dimension: the Jack of relevance of competitor analysis to their immediate needs. Managers put this in a variety of ways: "it has to make a difference to your bottom line;" "it has to demonstrate a real pay-off;" "it has to answer real questions." While nearly a third of the clients saw this as a major problem, fewer than 10% of the analysts mentioned it perhaps the biggest gap between the two groups in terms of what needs to be done to improve the CA systems of the companies. If this pattern is common in other companies as well, it is hardly surprising that some researchers have concluded that the key problem of formai competitor analysis is that it does not meet the needs of managers (e.g. Prescott and Smith, 1987: 411) .
However, it is by no means the only problem, as we shall see below, and the problems lie as much in the concepts of "needs" and "use" as in the capacity of the CA function to deliver outputs.
The internai factor cited by the second largest number of clients also concerned implications: the lack of credibility of the analysts who provided the information and analysis on which the company would act if it were to draw the implications for action from the CA's outputs. The most frequently mentioned factor here was a relatively low level of line or product management experience among the analysts, so that some line managers had an a priori scepticism about their ability to understand and interpret competitor information. Two other factors were also mentioned: the tact that the analysts did not try to check their own outputs by doing post mortem analyses, and (more salient for the analysts) the high turnover in the function, which meant that clients did not have time to develop trust in individual analysts.
This lack of credibility affected analysis activities as weli. It created an environnent in which analysts felt it was less costly to avoid any interpretation or analysis than to risk making an incorrect interpretation. The following comment of an analyst is suggestive:
"Personally, I'd rather make 25 predictions and have 20 of the right than make 3 and have them ail right. But I'm not sure that attitude is shared by my company and they make it very embarrassing if you're wrong."
The need for more prediction and less description was one of three problems mentioned by more than fifteen percent of the clients. As one manager put it, "I don't want to know what the other guy did to me yesterday; I want to know what he is going to do to me tomorrow." Another was very similar: the tendency for the CA function to put out too much data and too little analysis. The third was the lack of appropriate methodologies; the most frequent example was obtaining disaggregated data on production costs, productivity, R&D efficiency, and so on. Clients often recognized that "sometimes we do not know how to generate these figures for our own company, let atone competitors," but felt that this constrained the CA function's ability to generate useful analyses. Clients wanted numbers, but they also wanted to understand (or at least trust) the analytical methodologies that produced them, and to be confident that these were consistent, systematic, and rigorous.
One further problem in analysis was the difficulty of combining "hard"
and "soft" data in the corporation in general --a tendency to uncouple the two, and in so doing to take the "hard" data (the numbers) out of context, thereby creating serious problems in interpretation. One example cited by several SBU analysts in one company concerned a report from an SBU marketing unit tracking sales on a new product. Production problems had plagued the launch, and SBU marketing staff regarded the fact that they had maintained market share against a competing new product as a triumph on the part of their field sales organization (and they provided supporting information on the production problems). However, the figures on sales were taken out of the report by a member of the corporate CA unit, and later used as an example of marketing inertia by corporate analysts unaware of the context.
In addition, several respondents cited too Little continuity across outputs and too little ability to see the world from the competitor's point of view --a tendency to answer the question, "What would we do if we were in their position?" rather than, "What are they likely to do?" Data management factors were, not surprisingly, the most important internai factors for the analysts, although the concern was shared to a considerable degree by clients. For both groups, the factor most frequently cited was the inadequacy of information systems. In particular, the analysts felt that the problem of the "bulging filing cabinet" full of clippings and notes, and the consequent difficulty of retrieving information, cried out for technological solutions in storage and retrieval.
And better access to external information services and help in identifying the most useful and efficient services were also included in the perception of what Information technology could do to improve the CA function.
Three other data management factors were cited: the need to improve acquisition of information from line managers within the organization;
complaints that the same information was being recycled too many times; and (exclusively an analysts' concern) the fear that inadequate quality checks on the sources of information might be diminishing the quality of analysis and interpretation.
One encouraging aspect of these data is that both clients and analysts were aware that the problems of developing a more effective CA function could not be attributed only to the function itself, and that significant contextuel factors complicated its tisk. lndeed, competitor analysis was given support from top management precisely because it was seen as a potentiel change agent, helping to make the corporation more responsive to the competitive environnent and changing management habits of information use. Such changes could not be expected to occur quickly or painlessly.
Perhaps the most important discrepancy between analyst and client perceptions on external factors concerned the constraints on resources.
Competitor analysis has emerged at a time when most large U.S. companies are under severe pressure to "run lean" to reduce the scale of staff functions and cut expenditures, particularly on personnel. Analysts and their managers realize that appealing to management for more resources is simply not a realistic option, and hence they are driven to try to make the best possible use of existing resources. This in part explains the great appeal of new information technology in the function: a system that would reduce the amount of time expended on data management would free up time for the analysis which is increasingly the focus of client demands.
However, while it is not surprising that analysts should be more concerned with data management issues than clients, the analysts' focus on data management problems at the expense of analysis issues (compared to the concerns of the clients) is disturbing, although understandable. Many analysts told us that they were frustrated by spending most of their time on data management, especially gathering information. They felt that freeing up more time for analysis by finding solutions to the data problems would solve many of the function's problems in meeting the needs of its clients.
But the distrust of CA methodologies exhibited by many clients suggest that the problems on analysis are more extensive than simply misallocation of time. The most problematic aspect is the gap in the perception of the relevance of CA outputs to action and use. This indicates both low levels of feedback between clients and analysts, and a lack of clarity over how far the CA function should extend its value-adding activities into the implication dimension. These issues are addressed below; the section immediately following concentrates on the problem of use.
ORGANIZATIONAL USES OF COMPETITOR ANALYSIS
Our own findings above and the existing literature on environmental 11 scanning systems in general indicates that an ongoing challenge for those in scanning positions is to produce information that la seen as useful by managers . "Useful" has customarily been defined by researchers as information that la used directly in decision-making, either in the context of the strategic planning procesa or in operational and tactical decision-making by managers (Prescott and Smith, 1987) .
We began the research with the same strong focus on the contribution of formai competitor analysis to strategic, operational, and tactical decisionmaking, and therefore, in ail our interviews with clients, we asked the following question:
"Although clearly an increasing amount of competitor information is being gathered in this company, we are encountering some difficulty in finding out how it is actually used. Can you gave us an example or two from your recent experience in which competitor analysis played a particularly important role?"
The sceptical tone of the question was designed to push respondents to think of concrete examples, particularly because of a pervasive contradiction observed in an earlier study: while managers often say that environmental intelligence is extremely important for their tiras and for their own jobs, they experience considerable difficulty in identifying specific instances of their own use of such intelligence (Ghoshal and Kim, 1986 ).
Responses to this question yieided 63 cases of how CA had been used.
Analysis of these suggested that it was inappropriate to look only to specific decisions for the use of CA. In fact, the cases pointed to six different functions served by CA in organizations. In addition to decisionmaking by line management and strategic planning, which have been the focus of most investigations and normative prescriptions in the literature (e.g. Fuld, 1985) , we could identify four additional ways in which CA can benefit the organization: sensitization, legitimation, benchmarking, and inspiration (these are described and illustrated in the following pages). Table 2 identifies the number of cases we could classify into each of these six uses, and also shows, for each use, the number of cases where the information was obtained by the user from the formai CA function of the organization and those where the information was obtained from other sources.
--- Table 2 about here   Sensitizing In ail three companies, the CA function was set up in part because of concerne that the knowledge of the extent of the competitive threat faced by the company was not adequately shared throughout the company, even by upper management. The function therefore derived its initial visibility and legitimacy by making people aware that the company faced significant and formidable competitors to whom it must respond, and in some cases by changing the definition of the most significant competitor or of the most crucial dimensions of competition. In one company, for example, a long history of industry dominance had led to a widespread scepticism about a particular competitor who was viewed as a technologically inferior company with a strong home market position but without the capabilities to become a serious threat elsewhere. Through a powerful series of presentations, the CA unit of the company showed the remarkable progress the competitor had made in its product and process technologies, the graduai and carefully planned expansion of its share in many key markets, and hence the reality and urgency of the threat it posed to the company's long-terra future.
Another example from one of the other companies was a competitor analysis presentation that addressed the perception that a particular competitor was in an extremely vuinerable financial position and therefore not a significant competitor, and demonstrated how in fact it continued to be a serious threat both in the home market and abroad.
In each of these cases, the effect was to "shake up the troops" through presentations that combined data, interpretations, and conjectures imaginatively in order to challenge the organization's existing assumptions about particular competitors.
Benchmarking
Benchmarking provides a set of specific measures comparing the firm with its competitors on a set of key variables,such as capital investment, productivity, quality, and so on. Like sensitization, benchmarking challenges basic assumptions about the company and about its competitors (see Alston, 1986 , for a detailed description and analysis of how benchmarking was used in one large company).
In one case, the CA unit obtained from an outside agency reliable estimates of the different components of manufacturing costs for a number of competitors' plants. These estimates were then used as benchmarks for 13 setting cost targets for the company's own plants. In another company, the products of ail major competitors were collected and each component evaluated for quality. For each component, the higheat quality item was identified, regardless of producer, and was used as the basis for establishing the company's minimum quality standards. Similar benchmarking exercises with manpower strengths, wage bills, R&D expenditures, and so on were reported in each of the three firme.
Legitimation
A third use of comp etitor analysis is legitimation: that is, to justify certain proposais and to persuade members of the organization of the feasibility and desirability of a chosen course of action. This function becomes particularly important when the company plans to take actions that are in conflict with the interests and beliefs of influential internai members or external constituencies. In such cases opposition can be reduced by demonstrating that the action is necessity for meeting competitive challenges or by showing that a similar program has worked effectively for a competitor.
For example, in one case, CA facilitated a manufacturing rationalization program that involved closing some units and considerably reducing employment. The company prepared and widely disseminated a document that showed why the actions were essential for survival against a specific competitor who had developed a highly efficient production system. This document not only reduced employee resistance to the plan but also helped to convince external agencies, including government agencies and local politicians, of the necessity of the proposed changes. Another excellent example of CA as legitimation was provided by the general manager of a business unit in a company that was reducing personnel by an acrossthe-board percentage in ail areas. Beliveing strongly that his sales group was already at a serious competitive disadvantage because of its small size, he ordered a careful study of the number of sales people employed by his major competitors, and proved that his field sales force was already outnumbered by major competitors by a considerable margin. This analysis helped him get an exemption from the staff cuts. The difference between inspiration and legitimation can be summarized in two questions: how have others solved this problem (inspiration), and who has solved this problem this way (legitimation).
Planning
The use of competitor analysis to assist the formai planning process is widely advocated in the literature, and indeed in the interviews the largest number of cases of use cited (27 of 63) were contributions to the formai planning processes. These uses included contributions to estimates of market size and potentiel market share and assessments of potentiel opportunities for acquisitions (or divestments) of assets, firms, or technologies. One example from one of the three firms was the analysis of the political risk exposure of the international asset portfolio of key competitors, to ensure that the risk exposure of the firm's own asset base was not significantly greater.
Planning uses of CA were much more dependent on information from the formai CA function than any of the other uses. Indeed, for the other five categories of use, the role of information provider was approximately equally balanced between the formai CA structures and other sources.
Planning was the only exception in drawing much more heavily on the outputs of the formel function.
Decision-making
The contribution of CA to operational and tactical decision-making by line managers constituted the second largest category of exemples. by information and more demanding of analysis --as their sophistication about CA increases. CA must constantly struggle to stay ahead of the learning curves of its clients. And it must do so at a time when the corporation as a whole is tightening its belt, reducing the size of staff functions, and demanding well-grounded justifications for any increase in headcount. The CA function in ail three companies empioyed the following methods to meet the challenge of improving its own capacity to meet shifting client needs in an era of constrained resources.
Interaction with Clients: Reporting Structure and Feedback
Reporting relationships are important because they define mutual responsibility: the performance of required tasks on the one hand, and clear delineation of expectations and feedback on performance on the other. In general, most analysts would have preferred to report directly to the person they regarded as their most important client, both to improve communications channels and to raise the status of the CA function (the higher the status of the person reported to, the higher one's own status). However, in ail three companies, senior line managers at ail levels were wary of increasing the number of staff functions reporting directly to them, and CA specialists at ail levels reported to staff rather than line management.
Where CA evolved under the aegis of the planning function, it reported to the head of planning; where it had evolved under marketing intelligence, it reported ta the manager of that function. In the first case, contributing to the planning process was viewed as its primary function: the other uses (operational and tactical decision-making, legitimation, inspiration, benchmarking, and aensitizine had far less salience. Where it reported to the market intelligence function, it had a greater range of application, and often greater autonomy. At least one SBU-level analyst whose reporting relationship had recently been changed from the marketing to the planning function felt that his work was being too narrowly targeted on contributions to the development of formai plans, and that his growing success in providing a range of information to line management was being undercut.
The lack of a reporting relationship to line management, while virtually inevitable, appeared to have some unfortunate consequences for the CA function. One was the creation of a gap between the priority given to different clients and the priorities expected by the clients themselves. A more serious consequence of the lack of a direct reporting relationship to line management was the difficulty of getting useful feedback on outputs and establishing clearly the nature of client needs. In ail three companies, the analysts and their managers identified the lack of specific definitions of client needs as one of their most serious problems;
only two clients mentioned it as a salient problem. In the absence of the interactions stimulated by a direct reporting relationship, the analysts tried to project client needs from what they perceived to be indirect signais, and these tended to have extremely high noise levels.
These dilemmas are currently being addressed in the three companies primarily through the choice of dissemination mode. In ail three companies, analysts had considerable latitude in deciding on the frequency of outputs and the mode of their delivery. We found that the CA function used bath written and oral delivery modes, and that there was some use of electronic modes (Table 3) . greater impact than written documents, and they help to raise the visibility of the function, thereby extending its internai networks. They also provided the opportunity to gather as well as disseminate information.
Analysts felt greater freedom in presenting interpretations in oral presentations, because they could be presented as tentative and reactions could be elicited immediately from the audience. And this immediacy of feedback, of which the reaction to analysis was one aspect, was the major reason oral presentations were preferred. Presentations provided an opportunity to assess the extent to which CA outputs were interesting and useful to clients; they were a major mode of obtaining client feedback and gauging client needs. Ail too often, however, clients did not adequately recognize this last function of presentations, and focused their attention exclusively on the data and analysis presented, rather than addressing directly the issue of what they might want instead.
Analysts in general preferred the widest possible dissemination of outputs, either written or oral, in part because it enhanced their visibility and hence their collection of information from internai sources, and because most analysts felt that "shaking up the troops" (sensitization)
was an important aspect of their role. Many felt frustrated with the reluctance of senior management to encourage wide circulation of competitor information, a reluctance that was especially marked when the CA outputs contained a high level of analysis, or included comparable information on their own Company.
One additional aspect of dissemination should be noted. Prescott and Smith (1987) recently distinguished between a comprehensive system that produced regular CA outputs and a project-based mode that produced outputs as needed. In ail three companies we studied, the CA function was engaged in both.
Staffing the CA Function
Finding the people to staff the function who can keep abreast of changing demands and develop the function's own learning capacity is a demanding task. There are two basic strategies for staffing an emerging information function. One is to develop a cadre of specialists who spend much of their careers within that function (for convenience, we shall call this the "analyst strategy"). The other is to recruit high potential generalists for whom the function is a development assignment, sensitizing them to certain skills and frameworks that will add to their personal portfolio of management skills (the "fast-tracker strategy"). The epitome of a staff function using the analyst strategy is probably economic analysis; the fast-tracker strategy is most common in strategic planning.
The profiles of the two types emerged clearly in response to the question, "What do you like most about your job?" "Analysts" tended to respond with statements of how much they enjoyed the challenge of putting information together, solving "puzzles," and learning. "Fast-trackers" tended to cite the interaction with top management, the excitement of understanding the competitive environment, and the opportunity to "make a real difference to this company" as the key aspects they enjoyed.
The advantages of the "analyst strategy" to the CA function itself probably outweigh those of the fast-tracker strategy. Having people build up expertise over time and holding them in the function improves CA capabilities as a whole. The fast-tracker strategy not only creates rapid turn-over in the function; it may aise create an incentive structure for the individual that may be inimical to building learning curves in the function.
Fast-track generalists tend to achieve personal gratification and high evaluations by initiating new programs or approaches, rather than by institutionalizing and consolidating those begun by their predecessors. The rewards in most Western companies are greater for innovation than for institutionalization.
On the other hand, for the company overall, the advantages of the fasttrack strategy in this function are considerable. Of the "fast-track"
analysts we interviewed, most stated that one of the things they liked best about the job was that they gained a strategic overview of the competitive environment and of their own company, an overview they could not have In all three companies, project teams were used to focus on a particular issue or a particular competitor, with the objective of producing a comprehensive report within a given time frame. The teams were composed of people from all over the company who had particular expertise in the area, predominantiy but not entirely from CA positions. One such project, for example, had the mandate to produce a strategic profile of a key competitor, emphasizing its vulnerabilities and how those could be exploited. It included representatives from the SBUs who confronted that competitor directly as well as from R&D, finance, and corporate planning.
In contrast to such special teams, which produced "one-shot" outputs, the ongoing competitor teams had the mandate of tracking a single competitor over time. Like the special project teams, they drew members from all over the company, but they were much more likely to draw on the competitor analysts dispersed throughout the company, because of the more extended time commitment involved. The outputs from such teams varied, but primarily took the foret of joint presentations on the competitor at planning meetings or as requested by SBUs and functional units throughout the company. One of the companies, for example, had a set of ongoing teams, each of whom followed a key competitor, and whose membership varied from about 25 for the major corporate competitors to 7-8 for firms which competed across a narrower range of SBUs. The major teams met fairly regularly, and the corporate CA unit had the responsibility for coordination and communication.
One step removed from the sustained interactions fostered by both types of teams was the joint presentation around a specified theme or competitor.
This involved CA analysts from various parts of the organization, each presenting their view of a competitor or competitive issue to an audience composed of corporate, group, and SBU managers and planners, with minimal advance coordination. The aim was to stimulate debate and discussion across the presenting groups and within the audience. For example, one company held an annuel forum which focused each year on a different competitor and the most salient issue at the time (such as the divestment strategy of a major competitor and the resulting opportunities for their own company).
The CA support group, in contrast, did not produce any competitor analyses; its function was to bring together CA specialists from ail over the company to exchange information and expertise, to share problems, and to deal with issues of competing client definitions.
The mix of coordinating mechanisms in each company varied according to current needs and time available. The special project teams had the advantage of being highly visible and involving people from outside the CA function; they had the drawback of discontinuous outputs, a problem that tended to loom larger as CA became more established. For the ongoing competitor teams, the situation was reversed: they could provide continuity in outputs, and build learning curves on a single competitor, but they ran the risk of becoming too routinized and losing visibility. The joint presentation had the obvious disadvantage of minimizing ongoing interaction across CA units; however, coupled with a CA support group to develop shared learning in the function (as it was in one company we studied), it was wellsuited to a company where information synergy across SBUs was relatively low.
Make or Buy
The boom in competitive strategy has given rise to a large number of consulting firms that specialize in some or ail aspects of competitor analysis. A company can now purchase an array of CA services: competitor profiles, ongoing scanning of public information on competitors, internai "intelligence audits" to draw out the competitor information dispersed One of the most troublesome questions both for the researcher and the manager of the CA function is assessing its effectiveness or its contribution to the bottom line. As one manager put it succinctly, "Competitor analysis is just one piece of the puzzle in any major decision."
Drawing a direct line from the CA unit to the end performance of the company in the marketplace is extremely difficult. Uncertainty over how to assess the efficiency with which competitor analysis is produced and the responsibility for its effectiveness creates serious problems in allocating resources to the function --and in identifying objectively which CA practices and organizational structures are more effective than others.
These two related problems --the fact that CA is only one among many important information streams and the difficulties over resource allocation --have led one of the firms in the study to consolidate competitor analysis with other environmental scanning functions et the corporate level into a single business information unit, which includes industry and economic analysis, political risk assessment, the public affairs function, and any related functions. This allows for greater interaction across the various environmental information streams and enhances economies of scope in terms of data bases, secretarial support, and management. It also provides a more neutral umbrella for a function whose formai title has often been problematic: "competitor analysis" carries unsavory implications for many people both within and outside the corporation.
The same firm has moved to ensure that client evaluations of the function are rigorous and honest by making a significant part of the corporate CA function's budget dependent on allocations from the SBUs, thereby creating an internai market to "discipline" the staff function. The advantages of this system is forcing internai clients of the function to assess very carefully the value it adds to decisions and operations are clear. The potentiel danger is that in the balancing act of the corporate CA function between routinized, ongoing analysis of current and potential corporate competitors and special projects, between acting as the firm's center of expertise for the dispersed function and providing CA outputs to key internai clients, between raising the general awareness of competitive issues throughout the corporation and serving the immediate needs of a small number of top managers, the broader, longer-terni mandate will give way to the shorter-term, more tightly-focused activities.
1. Each interview covered a structured core of open-ended questions, plus exploratory conversations about the function that depended on the individual's experience and intereat.
2. The size and sponsorship of the CA function contrast markedly with the environmental analysis units studied by . The EAUs they studied were virtually all issues management or public affaira functions, 80% of which were single-person offices. They also found that "virtually every environmental analysis unit was sponsored, or "owned" by at least one top-level executive officer" (80). While we began the study expecting to test some of the findings based on the literature of EAUs, we found the differences in size, sponsorship, and dispersion so great as to reduce considerably the relevance of comparisons. 15.9*** 12.3*** Problems in reconciling hard/soft 9.5** 9.6 ** Noncumulative: outputs discontinuous 7.9*** 11.0** Own company template 7.9*** 1.4* IMPLICATIONS Lack of relevance of outputs to action 31.7*** 9.6** Credibility problems 19.0*** 15.1*** 1. The total for "credibility problems" consists of three factors: low level of line/product expertise (mentioned by 14.3% of clients and 5.5% of analysts), lack of self checking/post mortems (1.6% clients, 1.4% analysts). and high turnover in CA positions (3.2% clients, 8.2% analysts).
Key: *** mentioned in all 3 companies; ** mentioned in 2 companies; * mentioned in 1 company. 
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